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   Taylor Principle and In°ation Stability in Emerging
Market Countries








The goal of this paper is to evaluate the validity of the Taylor prin-
ciple for in°ation control in 12 developing countries that use in°ation
targeting regimes: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Israel, Mexico,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. The test
is based on a state-space model to determine when each country has
followed the principle; then a threshold unit root test is used to verify
if the stationarity of the deviation of the expected in°ation from its
target depends on compliance with the Taylor principle. The results
show that such compliance leads to the stationarity of the deviation of
the expected in°ation from its target in all cases. Furthermore, in most
cases, non-compliance with the Taylor principle leads to nonstationary
deviation of the expected in°ation.
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JEL Classi¯cation: E52, E31
1. INTRODUCTION
Does the Taylor Rule matter? Several works have discussed how e±cient
it would be to adopt the Taylor principle in order to guarantee economic
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stability. Such discussion has gained strength especially in the United States
where there is ¯rm evidence that unemployment and in°ation were higher
and more volatile between 1965 and 1980 than in the last 20 years. On the
one hand, several authors argue that such fact can be explained by an active
monetary policy (e.g. Judd and Rudebusch (1998); Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(2000); Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2003); Boivin and Giannoni (2003); Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004)). On the other hand, others argue that such disparity
is due to di®erent exogenous shocks between the periods (e.g. Blanchard
and Simon (2001); Stock and Watson (2002); Sims and Zha (2004); Primiceri
(2005)).
This paper attempts to test the validity of the Taylor principle for 12 emer-
ging market countries that have adopted in°ation targeting regimes: Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South
Africa, Thailand and Turkey. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First,
it suggests an alternative method to test the validity of Taylor Rules. In con-
trast to the related literature, in which the relationship between monetary
policy and in°ation is linear1, this paper incorporates the nonlinearity of this
speci¯c relationship. In particular, an adaptation of the threshold unit root
test proposed by Caner and Hanser (2001) is suggested. Compliance with
the Taylor principle is de¯ned as a binary variable obtained through a pre-
estimated state-space model. Such variable is used to de¯ne a threshold where
the Taylor principle is respected in one regime but not in another one. Then,
the test is conducted in order to verify if the stationarity of the deviation of
the expected in°ation from its target changes according to the regime. That
is, we aim to verify if the deviation of the expected in°ation is stationary
when the Taylor rule is respected, and if that holds true otherwise.
The second contribution is that the selection of emerging market countries
with in°ation targeting regimes increases the possibility for further discussion
on the validity of the Taylor principle. This occurs because the relationship
between in°ation stabilization and monetary policies could be di®erent for de-
1There are other nonlinear tests for the Taylor principle, as in Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004), but they do not use the same framework as suggested hereTAYLOR PRINCIPLE AND INFLATION STABILITY 3
veloped and developing countries (see Gon» calves and Salles, 2006). Therefore,
developed countries are not expected to derive important economic gains from
their compliance with the Taylor principle since they were not su®ering from
severe in°ation problems or other destabilizing macroeconomic disturbances.
In addition, compliance with Taylor rules might be more important for the
performance of emerging market economies than for developed countries. Mo-
reover, because these countries have adopted in°ation targeting regimes, the
rule used by them and also the exact deviation of the expectation from its
target can be more accurately determined (Woodford, 2003).
The results can be summarized as follows. In all cases in which the Central
Bank (CB) complies with the Taylor principle, the deviation of the expected
in°ation from its target is stationary, that is, the equilibrium is determined.
At the same time, when the CB does not comply with the Taylor principle,
the deviation of the expected in°ation from its target is nonstationary in, not
all, but most of the cases.
2. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
As previously discussed, in the past years, the theoretical discussion on
monetary economy has developed from the e±ciency point of view about
monetary policy rules. According to a signi¯cant approach the CB should
respond to deviations of the expected in°ation from its target and to the
output gap through monetary policy rules in order to guarantee equilibrium
determination. In this respect, following Woodford (2003), the economy can
be represented by two basic equations: one given by the IS intertemporal
curve and another by a new-Keynesian Phillips curve.
It is possible to demonstrate that the system of di®erence equations given
by the Phillips and IS curves leads to an undetermined rational expectati-
ons equilibrium. That means that an in¯nite number of possible equilibrium
responses of the endogenous variable to real shocks can be obtained - inclu-
ding situations where in°ation and output °uctuations are disproportionately
larger in relation to changes in the fundamentals.4 VLADIMIR KÄ UHL TELES AND MARTA ZAIDAN
In order to guarantee the determination of the equilibrium, the CB has to
adopt an interest rate feedback rule. In this case, several rules can be adopted.
Nevertheless, countries which have adopted in°ation targeting regimes should
react to the deviations of the expected in°ation from its target to ensure the
stability of the system consistently with such target (Woodford 2003, chap 4).
In other words, the rule should be as follows:
^ it =¹ i + ½(^ it¡1 ¡¹ i) + Á¼(Et¼t+12 ¡ ¹ ¼) + Áx(xt) (1)
where x is the output gap, ^ i is a linearization of the nominal interest rate
di®erence in relation to the equilibrium, ¼ is the in°ation, t is time, E is the
expectation operator. That is, the nominal interest rate determined by the
CB responds to the deviation of the expected in°ation from its target in the
proportion Á¼ and to the output gap in the proportion Áx while it follows a
smoothing rule.
By using this rule, two conditions are necessary in order for the interest
rate rule (1) to guarantee the determination of the equilibrium. The ¯rst one
is given by:
Á¼ + ­Áx > 1 ¡ ½ (2)
where ­ > 0 is given by a combination of parameters that re°ect the nominal
and real levels of economic rigidity. This condition is similar to the Taylor
principle, since the reaction of the interest rate to in°ation shocks should be
more than proportional in order to have the in°ation stabilized at the desired
level. The second condition is given by:
Á¼ < 1 + ½ + ­(Áx + ¤(1 + ½)) (3)
This condition suggests that if an excessively rigorous Central Bank shows
a disproportionately larger reaction to in°ation, the economy is in an unde-
termined equilibrium. This was explained by Bernanke and Woodford (1997)TAYLOR PRINCIPLE AND INFLATION STABILITY 5
and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), who demonstrated that this conduct
of monetary policy can lead to an increase in the deviation of the expected
in°ation from its target due to self-ful¯lling expectations.
In short, this paper aims to estimate and calibrate the values included in
conditions (2) and (3) above to test whether they are necessary and su±cient
to allow the expected in°ation to automatically return to its target. The
following two subsections describe the procedures used to estimate the model's
parameters for each time period and how these estimations are used to test
the validity of these conditions.
2.1. De¯nition of Monetary Policy Rules
The ¯rst step to test the validity of the conditions for equilibrium deter-
mination is to establish the parameter values. Thus, the economy's ¯xed
parameters were calibrated to ­ = 0:1 and ¤ = 1:28following Woodford
(2003). footnoteTeles and Brundo (2006) calibrated such values to the Brazi-
lian economy and obtained very similar results. By using sensitivity analysis,
they also showed that changes in these parameters do not signi¯cantly alter
the results. Therefore it can be argued that these parameters can be used for
all countries included in this paper.. However, the monetary policy reaction
parameters are obtained using a state-space model with time-varying para-
meters to estimate equation (1) with parameters Á¼, Áx and ½ varying along
time following an autoregressive process, i.e., according to:
^ it = ¹ i + ½t(^ it¡1 ¡¹ i) + Á¼t(Et¼t+12 ¡ ¹ ¼) + Áxt(xt) (4)
½t = ®i½t¡1 + ui (5)
Á¼t = ®¼Á¼t¡1 + u¼ (6)
Áxt = ®xÁxt¡1 + ux (7)6 VLADIMIR KÄ UHL TELES AND MARTA ZAIDAN
where equation (4) is the measurement equation and equations (5) through
(7) are the transition equations.
Once the values of the Central Bank's reaction parameters are obtained
for each point in time, the parameters are applied to conditions (2) and (3)
along with the economy's calibrated values in order to verify the periods in
which the Central Bank complied with these conditions and when it did not.
Therefore, the following binary variable is de¯ned:
¸t =
(
0; if CB do not respect conditions (2) and (3)
1; if CB respect conditions (2) and (3)
(8)
Thus, variable ¸ de¯nes two monetary policy regimes. Such variable provi-
des the basis for testing whether the deviation of the expected in°ation from
its target converges automatically to the target when conditions (2) and (3)
are, or are not, met. At the same time, it tests whether the non-observation
of these conditions leads to an undetermined equilibrium behavior. In fact,
condition (3) was observed in all cases for all countries; therefore the variable
¸ simply de¯nes if the Central Bank has complied with the Taylor principle.
2.2. Testing the Taylor Principle
To test the e±ciency of monetary rules, it is necessary to use a test that
contemplates the nonlinear nature laid down by the theory. However, the tests
commonly used in the literature to assess the validity of the Taylor principle
do not specify this nonlinear behavior. This paper seeks to contribute to this
literature by using the threshold autoregressive model (TAR). We propose
to verify if the deviation of the expected in°ation from its target presents
di®erent processes when the conditions for equilibrium determination are, or
are not, observed. So, the test can be described by the following equation:
¢(Et¼t+12 ¡ ¹ ¼)t = µ1¸tZt¡1 + µ2(1 ¡ ¸t)Zt¡1 + ² (9)
where Zt¡1 = ((Et¼t+12 ¡ ¹ ¼)t¡1; ¢(Et¼t+12 ¡ ¹ ¼)t¡1;::: ¢(Et¼t+12 ¡ ¹ ¼)t¡k).
That is, when the Central Bank respects the conditions for equilibrium deter-TAYLOR PRINCIPLE AND INFLATION STABILITY 7
minacy ¸t = 1 and the model is given by ¢(Et¼t+12 ¡ ¹ ¼)t = µ1Zt¡1 + ². On
the other hand, when the conditions are not respected ¸t = 0 and the model
is given by ¢(Et¼t+12 ¡ ¹ ¼)t = µ2Zt¡1 + ². Thus, whether the conditions for
equilibrium determinacy suggested by the theory are valid µ1 6= µ2. As a
result, the deviation of the expected in°ation is di®erent for periods in which
the Central Bank complies with the rule. Therefore, the null hypothesis for
the ¯rst test is H0 : µ1 = µ2.
The most interesting case concerning this test is that the deviation of the
expected in°ation is possibly stationary when ¸t = 1, containing a unit root
otherwise. Such circumstance is clearly a nonstationary situation; however,
it is not a classic unit root process. From a monetary theory standpoint, this
means that the in°ation expectation naturally converges to the target if, and
only if, ¸t = 1. Consequently, in this case the unit root test with threshold is
very useful to verify the validity of the theory.
The test distribution was exhaustively studied by Caner and Hansen (2001).
The Wald test is indicated to verify the existence of a threshold. However, the
traditional critical values of the Wald test are not valid in the presence of a unit
root. At the same time, as documented by Pippenger and Goering (1993), in
the case of the unit root test the presence of a threshold signi¯cantly decreases
the power of the traditional ADF test. Therefore, critical values should be
obtained adequately for each test.
Caner and Hansen (2001) found the asymptotic distribution of the test, but
they showed that, in the case of small samples, the critical values can not
be tabulated in a standard fashion. Thus, the best alternative is to estimate
the critical values through bootstrap simulations for each case. As a result,
we obtained the critical values for the unit root test by assuming that the
true process is stationary (null hypothesis) through bootstrap simulations. In
this paper, 10,000 bootstrap simulations were conducted to obtain the critical
values for the tests.
Consequently, the application of the threshold and the unit root tests for
the regime with ¸t = 0 indicates the validity of the Taylor principle and8 VLADIMIR KÄ UHL TELES AND MARTA ZAIDAN
of the conditions for equilibrium determination with rational expectations
anticipated by the theory.
2.3. Database
For each country, the estimation of the system (4)-(7) was based on monthly
data from the adoption of an in°ation targeting regime to July 2007. For the
output, data from the manufacturing industry were used. An HP (Hodrick-
Prescott) ¯lter was used to create a potential output series in the output log
series. The output gap was calculated by the di®erence between the log of the
original series of the deseasonalized output and the potential output obtained
by the HP ¯lter.
Through a linear interpolation, the target, which is usually annual, had to
be modi¯ed to an annualized monthly target. All the data were obtained from
o±cial governmental websites and the expected in°ations were obtained from
information provided by the Central Banks of the countries. The information
about interest rates, which was obtained from the International Financial
Statistics (IFS) of IMF.
3. RESULTS
The analysis was simulated for 12 emerging market countries that use in-
°ation targeting regimes: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Israel, Mexico,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. The initial
analysis for determination of periods in both regimes resulted in di®erent ca-
ses for each country. Brazil, Poland and Turkey presented periods in which
the Taylor principle was respected and others in which it was not. On the
other hand, South Africa, Colombia, and the Philippines have never complied
with the Taylor principle. Finally, Chile, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Peru and
Thailand stuck to the principle in all of the periods analyzed.
For countries in which both regimes were identi¯ed, a threshold analysis was
performed. For the other countries, we assumed that there was no threshold
and a simple augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test was run, whichTAYLOR PRINCIPLE AND INFLATION STABILITY 9
TABLE 1.
Taylor Principle Tests











South Africa -1.82 0.37
Colombia -3.34 0.02
Philippines -1.35 0.60
Two-Regime Cases (Threshold Test)
Threshold Test t1 t2
Brazil 176.50* 3.57* -7.60
Poland 9.47 17.74* 0.43
Turkey 0.17 14.37* 5.68*
OBS: (*) null hypothesis rejected at 5% of signi¯cance
is equivalent to a case without threshold. The results are presented in Table
1.
The results show that the unit root can be rejected in all the relevant cases
when determinacy conditions are observed (regime 1), that is, Chile, Hungary,
Israel, Mexico, Peru and Thailand throughout the period, and Brazil, Poland
and Turkey during regime 1 (test statistic in t1 column). These results provide
evidence that the observation of the Taylor principle was a su±cient condition
for equilibrium determination.
However, the results do not indicate that this is a necessary condition.
Some cases, like Colombia (during the entire period) and Turkey (during10 VLADIMIR KÄ UHL TELES AND MARTA ZAIDAN
regime 2) showed that in°ation expectation converged to the target even when
determinacy conditions were not satis¯ed.
Notwithstanding, there is evidence from South Africa and the Philippines
(during the entire period) and from Brazil and Poland (during regime 2) that
the non-observation of Taylor principle leads to the nonstationarity of the
deviation of the expected in°ation from its target.
4. CONCLUSION
The paper evaluates whether the Taylor principle is applicable to 12 emer-
ging market countries that have adopted in°ation targeting regimes: Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South
Africa, Thailand and Turkey.
To do that, we suggest an alternative method to test the validity of the
Taylor Rule based on an adaptation of the threshold unit root test proposed
by Caner and Hanser (2001). The compliance with the Taylor principle is
de¯ned as a binary variable obtained through a pre-estimated state-space
model. Such variable is used to de¯ne a threshold where the Taylor principle
is respected in one regime but not in another one. Then, the test is conducted
in order to verify if the stationarity of the deviation of the expected in°ation
from its target changes according to the regime.
The results undisputedly show that when the Central Bank complies with
the Taylor principle the deviation of the expected in°ation from its target is
stationary, but when the opposite holds true, such deviation is nonstationary
in most of the cases.
The results provide a clear prescription of the Taylor principle. That is, if a
Central Bank wants to stabilize in°ation around the target, it should closely
follow a long-term more than proportional reaction rule in relation to the
expected in°ation deviations.TAYLOR PRINCIPLE AND INFLATION STABILITY 11
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